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Anew study has found that brain-damaged patients impaired in the production
of an action also find it difficult to recognize the sound of the same action,
providing new insights into the complex relationship between action
production and action recognition.
Bradford Z. Mahon
How do we recognize the actions of
other individuals? Motor theories of
perception argue that motor processes
play an active and necessary role in
the recognition of familiar actions. The
basic claim of this class of theories is
that perceived actions are mapped
onto the motor routines that would be
required in order to produce those
same actions. Through the activation
of those motor routines, the observer
is then able to recognize, and
meaningfully interpret, the observed
action. A central prediction of motor
theories of action recognition is that
when motor processes are
compromised, recognition processes
should be similarly affected. In this
issue, Pazzaglia et al. [1] report new
neuropsychological evidence
suggesting a close link between
impairments for producing actions
and impairments for recognizing the
sounds of actions.
The motor theory of perception was
initially developed in the domain of
speech perception by Liberman et al.
[2]. The theory has since been
expanded and applied to visual and
auditory action recognition [3], object
recognition ([4], but see [5]), and even
mental state attribution ([6], but see [7]).
These extensions of the motor theory
of perception were spurred by
Rizzolatti and colleagues’ observation
that some neurons in frontal and
parietal motor structures of the
macaque monkey brain discharge
during both the execution and
observation of actions — these are the
so-called ‘mirror’ neurons. A growing
literature using a range of methods —
such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging and transcranial magnetic
stimulation — has described the
putative human homologues of the
macaque mirror neuron system (for
review, see [3]; and see Dinstein et al.
[8] for healthy skepticism about the
empirical basis of the mirror neuron
system).
The motor theory of action
recognition faces two major
challenges. First, it is difficult to
determine whether the motor system is
activated during perception because
motor processes are necessary for
perception, supportive but not
necessary, or merely connected to,
but not functionally relevant for,
perception. Experiments that
demonstrate that the motor system is
automatically engaged during action
perception do not distinguish among
these interpretations. This is because
a theory is lacking about the dynamics
of how information is exchanged
among (potentially distinct) perceptual
and motor processes [9].
The second challenge faced by the
motor theory of action recognition
comes from neuropsychological
studies of patients with apraxia.
Apraxia is an impairment for action
production that cannot be explained
by low-level muscle or motor
disturbances, nor by an inability to
comprehend the task (as, for example,
because of problems with perception
or language understanding). For
instance, apraxic patients may be
impaired at demonstrating the use of
objects (transitive actions, such as
using a hammer), and/or performingfamiliar gestures that do not involve
objects (intransitive gestures, such
as waving goodbye). Several studies
[10–12] have reported correlations
across groups of patients between
their ability to produce actions and their
ability to recognize and/or imitate
visually presented actions (performed
with the hand/arm). These data are
consistent with the motor theory of
action recognition. But a number of
studies have shown that patients with
apraxic impairments may be relatively
unimpaired for recognizing the same
actions that they cannot produce
([11–17]; see also Table S2 in [1]). This
means that successful action
recognition does not require the normal
functioning of the action production
system, and is at variance with the
central prediction made by the motor
theory of action recognition [18,19].
Pazzaglia et al. [1] now report new
data in the auditory domain that
address the two major challenges
faced by the motor theory of action
recognition. The authors defined
different groups of patients on the
basis of their ability to imitate the
actions of another individual. One
group of patients, with buccofacial
apraxia, were differentially impaired at
imitating actions involving the mouth;
another group, with limb apraxia, were
differentially impaired at imitating
actions performed by the hand/limb [1].
All of the patients were then tested on
their ability to match sounds to
pictures. The sounds were the
canonical sounds that are produced
either by mouth actions (for example,
slurping soup), limb actions (for
example, using scissors), or
non-human related environmental
sounds (for example, airplane flying).
The authors found that patients with
(selective) buccofacial apraxia were
differentially impaired for the
sound-picture matching task for
mouth-related actions. In contrast,
patients with (selective) limb apraxia
were differentially impaired for
sound-picture matching for
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analysis, they showed that, while
frontal and parietal motor regions, as
well as the insula, were reliably
damaged in both groups of patients,
there was differential frontal
involvement for patients with
buccofacial apraxia. While the lesion
data do not cleanly map onto the
somatotopic organization of motor
structures, they do demonstrate
dissociable neural substrates for
buccofacial and limb apraxia.
Pazzaglia et al.’s [1] findings
elegantly show that action production
and action recognition impairments
can be associated at the level of
specific effectors. Their study has
a number of virtues. It is the first
detailed study of the ability of apraxic
patients to recognize action-related
sounds. Another advantage of the
study is that, while the patients were
selected for enrollment on the basis of
their ability to imitate different types of
actions, the patients were included on
a consecutive basis. Thus, the different
groups of patients were established
independently of their performance
on the critical test of sound-picture
matching. The pattern of empirical
results is particularly strong because of
the presence of a double dissociation
over the same materials, thus ruling out
alternative explanations in terms of
differential difficulty for the mouth- or
limb-action tests.
This new study [1] sheds light on
several issues for future research. For
instance, research on the ‘mirror
neuron system’ has generally not
considered the potential role of those
same neurons/regions in monitoring
actions performed in the first person
(see [20] for relevant findings). Do
mirror-like properties of the motor
system piggy-back on a more basic
system that has developed in order to
keep track of one’s own actions?
Future work will also need to address
whether the associations of impairment
that Pazzaglia et al. [1] report are due
to damage to motor structures per se,
or rather to structures that are
immediately adjacent to the motor
system and which process and
represent more abstract knowledgeof actions. Another important issue is
whether motor simulations would be
able, in principle, to distinguish
between different actions that are
highly similar in terms of their kinematic
properties but radically different in
terms of their meaning and/or goals [7].
More generally, the study by
Pazzaglia et al. [1] highlights an
important theoretical vacuum: as
a field, we are lacking a theory that can
explain both the dissociations between
action production and recognition, and
the associations of impairments in
action production and recognition [9].
Strong forms of the motor theory of
action recognition can explain the
associations of impairment, but fail to
explain dissociations. Theories at the
other end of the hypothesis space,
which assume a strict separation
between action recognition processes
and action production processes
(for example, [19]), can explain the
dissociations but have difficulty
explaining the associations (at least,
as arising from damage to a single
process/mechanism). Ultimately, we
will need an account that can explain
both types of neuropsychological
evidence. The most likely hypothesis
occupies a middle ground between the
two extremes: action recognition is
‘grounded’ in the action production
system, not because motor processes
are constitutive of recognition
processes, but because perception
and production are heavily interactive.
Such a framework would shift the
focus of study away from
demonstrating the existence of
perceptually-driven neural responses
within the motor system, and toward
an understanding of how information
is communicated between perceptual
and motor systems.
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